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This paper explores the various governance models for financially 
distressed firms. We offer a new typology of major bankruptcy models and 
provide a connection between this bankruptcy law puzzle and the 
variables depicting the governance of healthy firms in order to shed light 
on two topics: (1) the factors that the lawyer should consider before 
removing its national bankruptcy law, and (2) the risks associated with 
each bankruptcy model according to the economic literature on 
bankruptcy law. Our final aim is to test whether the various bankruptcy 
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Since the corporate bankruptcy law affects both the resolution of financial distress and 
the incentives of stakeholders of healthy firms, whether a corporate bankruptcy regime is 
economically efficient depends on its capacity to achieve two themes. First, a bankruptcy 
regime achieves ex ante efficiency if it creates good incentives for both investors and debtors. 
For instance, bankruptcy law affects entrepreneurs' incentives to take risk and the terms on 
which banks will lend. Second, the legal system, which provides the framework in which 
bankruptcies are resolved, achieves ex post efficiency when only economically efficient but 
financially distressed firms are saved. When an economically inefficient firm becomes 
bankrupt, the best outcome is then for its assets to be liquidated, thereby releasing its capital 
to move to higher value use. In practice, it is difficult to determine with certainty which 
category a firm falls into. Some economically inefficient failing firms (which should have 
been liquidated) mistakenly may be categorized as efficient and allowed to reorganize (type-I 
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errors). Conversely, type-II errors occur when some economically efficient but failing firms 
may liquidate in bankruptcy, either because no reorganization procedure exists or because a 
procedure exists but some efficient firms are mistakenly categorized as inefficient. Recent 
analysis in Law and Finance suggest that it is impossible to determine which bankruptcy 
model, either pro debtor or pro secured creditors, is more economically efficient. Indeed, pro 
secured creditors (resp. pro debtors) are more likely to generate type II (resp. type I) errors. 
Further, under a tough bankruptcy regime which favors liquidation, managers have an 
incentive to make greater efforts to maximize the firm’s value, so that the number of 
distressed firms tends to be lower (Aghion, Hart and Moore (1992)). At the opposite, the same 
managers alternatively may hide their financial distress in order to avoid filing for a tough 
bankruptcy procedure (Li and Li (1999), Povel (1999)). Both rival bankruptcy systems have 
also an impact on banks’ strategies such as credit rationing or the incentives to monitor the 
firm.  A priori, a pro debtor bankruptcy model would exacerbate credit rationing (Myers 
(1977)) whereas it would create stronger incentives to monitor the firm (Zazzaro (2005)). 
However, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny ((1998), we note LLSV hereafter) 
find that investors friendly bankruptcy laws, by controlling for the quality of law enforcement, 
are desirable to promote the development of financial markets. Since common law countries 
offer a better protection to secured creditors and shareholders than civil law countries, 
common law countries have more developed financial markets and a property of the capital 
more dispersed. Common law countries consequently would provide larger resources for 
economic growth. In other words, the distinction between market or bank-based systems is 
minor relative to the differences in legal traditions to explore the determinants of economic 
growth (Levine (2002), Beck and Levine (2004)). In addition, Ergungor (2004) explains that 
civil law systems are more bank based than common law countries because banks would 
emerge due to the civil law courts’ greater inefficiency to resolve conflicts between firms and 
investors. Contrary to the preceding authors, he considers that legal families differ not only in 
investors’ legal rights but also in the judges’ rights relative to the flexibility in interpreting the 
law and creating new rules.  
 
In this paper, we focus on legal bankruptcy rules to provide a new benchmark for 
discussions of the diversity of bankruptcy laws across countries
5. We show that the classical 
opposition between the pro secured creditors model and the pro debtor model does not reflect 
the heterogeneity of governance models of financially distressed firms
6. To fill this gap, we 
originally classify the main legal bankruptcy rules across a sample of developed and 
developing countries
7 to shed light on differences in the legal ways to resolve corporate 
financial distress. Contrary to the classical approach in law and finance, we do not test 
whether one of the proposed bankruptcy models is superior to another one to promote 
financial development, or to improve ex ante/ex post efficiency of the bankruptcy process for 
two reasons. First, LLSV (1997, 1998, 2000) provided empirical evidence that equity markets 
and banks develop better in countries within which the rights of investors are well protected. 
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Second, we do not have any proxy for ex post efficiency of bankruptcy law
8. Our aim is to 
provide a connection between our bankruptcy law puzzle and the variables depicting the 
governance of healthy firms in order to shed light on (1) the factors that the lawyer should 
consider before removing its national bankruptcy law, and (2) the risks associated with each 
bankruptcy model according to the economic literature on bankruptcy law
9. In other words, 
we test whether the various bankruptcy models detailed in the paper perform in separate 
economic and legal environments. For instance, do the most creditors friendly bankruptcy 
models perform in countries with a larger banking sector? Does there exist a particular 
bankruptcy model for developing countries? Do the differences in legal families may explain 
the bankruptcy puzzle? Are the legal rules, which drive the way that firms go out of the 
market, associated with specific legal barriers on creation of new firms? Finally, do 
bankruptcy laws protecting workers through deviations from absolute priority rule vary across 
countries according to the legal rigidity of the employment market?  
 
Below, Section 2 sets out the bankruptcy puzzle or the classification of bankruptcy 
models across countries. Section 3 examines the economic, legal environment in which the 
various bankruptcy models perform. Section 4 presents our conclusions. 
 
2. The puzzle of bankruptcy law models 
 
We agree with a large number of lawyers and economists that the bankruptcy rules 
which are the more likely to affect the resolution of financial distress and the stakeholders' 
behaviour prior bankruptcy are 1) the automatic stay on creditors’ claims during the 
reorganization process, 2) the absolute priority rule between claimants, and 3) the possibility 
that an official appointed by the court or by the creditors becomes responsible for the firm’s 
operations during reorganization
10. We consequently look at this set of bankruptcy rules 
gathered by the World Bank to describe the various performing bankruptcy models. We also 
consider that the most discriminating legal rule is the automatic stay on creditors' claims 
because it makes the fundamental distinction between the systems which favor continuation 
of the firm and the ones which favor liquidations (or at least immediate liquidations). Indeed, 
if the law does not prevent secured creditors to exert their securities, the manager has no (or 
very few) chance to reorganize. The second concern of the law is the distribution of 
reorganization/liquidation proceeds among claimants. Especially, when the law does not order 
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than in their veto power relative to the adoption of a continuation plan. We also notice that Ergungor (2004) 
considers only these three legal rules in its demonstration of the emergence of banks, based on differences in 
legal traditions.   4 
an automatic stay on creditors’ claims, bankruptcy law respects the absolute priority rule in a 
large majority of countries (liquidation tends to be more creditors friendly). At the opposite, 
once the law prevents secured creditors from gaining possession of their security, we find 
empirical evidence that the law may either facilitate raising secured creditors’ recovery rates, 
or rank first unsecured claimants in the distribution of proceeds. Finally, we take into account 
the place of the manager during the reorganization process in order to oppose two visions of 
bankruptcy law. There is an old one which removes the bankrupt manager and a modern one 
which relies more heavily on debtors-in-place, by reducing the risks supported by managers. 
From this ordering of legal rules, we set out in graph 1 eight combinations (we exclude 
combinations which perform in less than two countries
11). As such, below, we look only at 
four combinations of bankruptcy rules:
12 the Social Pro Debtor Model, the Entrepreneurial 
Pro Debtor Model, the Repressive Model and the Pro Secured Creditors Model. 
                                                 
11 This is the case for (0,0,1) Greece, (0,1,1) Japan and Uruguay, (1,0,0) no country and (1,0,1) New Zealand. 

































Graph 1: classification of bankruptcy legal rules 
Data description: NAS means no automatic stay on secured claims. The variable equals one if bankruptcy code 
does not allow for an automatic stay on secured creditors' claims. SCF means secured creditors first. It equals 
one if bankruptcy law enforces the absolute priority rule, i.e. secured creditors are paid first before the State or 
workers. Finally, MNSR means that the manager does not stay at the head of the firm during the reorganization 




Models  NAS  SCF  MNSR  Countries 
Social Pro Debtor Model  0  0  0  Peru - Columbia – Mexico 
Philippines – France - Brazil  
Entrepreneurial Pro Debtor Model  0  1  0 
Argentina - Portugal - Australia 
Ireland - Canada - United States 
Finland - Switzerland - Chile - Italia 
Netherlands – Norway- Turkey – Sweden 
Repressive Model  1  1  1 
Great Britain - India – Kenya – Egypt 
Pakistan -Malaysia - Ecuador 
Israel - Zimbabwe - Thailand 
Pro Secured Creditors Model  1  1  0  Germany - Austria – Denmark 
Belgium – Spain 
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2.1 The social pro debtor model 
 
The first bankruptcy model integrates an automatic stay on creditors' claims, 
authorizes the manager to stay ahead of the firm during reorganization, and the privileged 
creditors' claims (State or workers) have priority over secured creditors. This model favors 
firm’s continuation and protects the interests of workers. It may result from the essential place 
of the manager to maintain the firm as a going concern (especially for small and medium 
business), from the desire to preserve employment, or from the necessity to induce managers 
to reveal financial distress earlier (Li and Li, (1999), Povel, (1999)). Since creditors cannot 
exert their security and the absolute priority rule is seldom respected, some credit rationing 
may also appear (Franks, Nyborg and Torous (1996)). At the same time, once the bank is fully 
secured, it has less incentive to monitor and restructure the distressed firm (Manove, Padilla 
and Pagano (2000)). Secured banks may also behave opportunistically towards junior 
creditors by increasing the value of their own loans at the other creditors' expense (Franks and 
Sussman (2002)). Finally, the automatic stay avoids creditors’ race to be first to recover their 
debts at the time of bankruptcy (Baird (1986)). 
 
2.2 The entrepreneurial pro debtor model 
 
In the social pro debtor model, the legislator wants to protect workers from the 
financial distress even if it reduces the proceeds for secured creditors. The second model 
differs in the respect of the absolute priority rule. Indeed, an automatic stay on creditors' 
claims exists and the manager has substantial rights to run firm’s operations while a 
reorganization plan is being constructed. So, there is a way, in practice, to promote 
continuation of bankrupt firms without giving priority to workers on the firm’s assets
13. A 
repercussion of such a debtor friendly system may be that borrowers strategically file for 
bankruptcy in order to renegotiate their debt and labour contracts.  
 
2.3 The repressive model 
 
In the repressive model, the sanction of the financially distressed debtor prevails. 
Beyond the protection of secured creditors' rights (see the absolute of priority rule and the 
stay on creditors’ claims), the debtor is not responsible for the operation of business during 
the bankruptcy process. From theory of incentives, managers are then attempted to expand 
greater efforts to increase the expected value of the firm (Aghion, Hart and Moore (1992)). 
We also argue that managers will choose investments which rely heavily on their skills 
(managerial entrenchment, Bebchuck and Picker (1996)). Finally, this model may generate ex 
post problems of coordination between creditors since there is no automatic stay on their 
claims. Such a race may lead to the firm's assets sale at a low price, with a consequent loss of 
value for all creditors. 
 
2.4 The pro secured creditors model 
 
The last model protects also the interests of secured creditors. No automatic stay on 
creditors' claims exists and the absolute priority rule is enforced. Only the attitude toward the 
debtor differs as the latter keeps the firm’s administration. On could argue that the protection 
of debtors during the reorganization process results either from the low size of companies, or 
                                                 
13 However, there may exist deviations of priority in favour of shareholders (here, the index concerns only 
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in favour of the minority shareholders (Weiss (1990), Franks and Torous (1989)).   7 
from the support granted to them by creditors. However, the secured creditors’ superior 
bargaining power relative to debtors may also prevent borrowers to continue their operations 
without creditors’ consent. 
 
Such a classification demonstrates that many differences exist in the rules that govern 
bankrupt firms and in the objectives of national bankruptcy codes. In this area of comparative 
law, a further key question is how to explain these differences. In our mind, bankruptcy law 
has an impact on stakeholders' strategies but the law may also result from the weight of the 
various stakeholders as well. Indeed, banks and equity markets are more developed in 
countries with the greater legal protection of investors (LLSV, (1997)). One could 
alternatively argue that the main source of financing influences the design of bankruptcy laws. 
For instance, bankruptcy laws are expected to be creditors friendly in bank based countries. 
Moreover, the differences in bankruptcy models may also reflect either the collective 
preferences on the legal protection of workers through continuation-oriented bankruptcy 
systems, or the differences in legal origins. In the next section, we evaluate this 
correspondence between our puzzle of bankruptcy models and other institutional components 
which influence the firm’s operations. 
 
3. In which environment does bankruptcy law perform?  
 
Below, we empirically study the links between bankruptcy law, legal sector (both legal 
origin and quality of law enforcement), financial sector (size and structure), legal rigidity of 
labour market, and rules which drive the creation of new firms. To measure the 
correspondence between the bankruptcy models detailed in section 2 and this set of variables, 
we compute for each variable the average score of bankruptcy models and the ANOVA test. 
We run the same methodology as LLSV (1998) when they test common law versus civil law 
countries average scores for their measures of investors’ legal protection and quality of law 
enforcement. However, since we do not compare two groups (as the two rival legal origins in 
LLSV (1998)), but test for equality of means among three or more groups (here, four 
bankruptcy models), we use ANOVA tests
14. 
 
3.1 Bankruptcy law, GDP per capita and legal environment 
 
Table 2 presents the results of equality of means tests for Gross Domestic Product, 
size of the unofficial economy, and legal environment by bankruptcy model. In each country, 
we consider for year 2000 the logarithmic of per capita Gross Domestic Product (in US 
dollars) and the size of the unofficial economy as a percentage of GDP
15. To evaluate the 
quality of law enforcement, we use the set of proxies employed by LLSV (1998): efficiency 
of the judicial system, rule of law, corruption and risk of expropriation. A detailed definition 





                                                 
14 In other words, the two-group case (relegated to the t-Statistics test) is a special case of the ANOVA (Fisher-
test). For each set of variables below, we run the same methodology and report values of Fisher Statistics. 
Further, averages that differ significantly at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels in the Fisher Statistic are respectively 
denoted with ***,**, and *. 
15 Source: for both variables, we use the Financial Structure and Economic Development Database (see World 
Bank website).   8 










Expropriation  Corruption 
Test of means between 
bankruptcy models 
(Fisher Statistics) 
6.78***  6.15***  2.26*  10.69***  7.36***  5.62*** 
Social pro debtor model 
average  3998.18  37.93  6.41  4.66  7.04  5.46 
Entrepreneurial pro debtor 
model average  12419.27  18.68  8.39  8.74  9.01  8.26 
Repressive model average  2961.63  34.13  7.12  5.36  7.11  5.68 
Pro secured creditors 
model average  13708.18  18.1  8.85  9.40  9.68  8.74 
Sample average  8457.6  26.31  7.76  7.17  8.23  7.11 
Table 2: bankruptcy law, economic performance, unofficial economy and quality of law enforcement. 
Note: *** means significant at the 1 percent level, ** means significant at the 5 percent level, * means 
significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
We find empirical evidence that the GDP per capita, the size of the unofficial economy 
and the quality of law enforcement oppose two groups of bankruptcy models. Countries with 
strong quality of law enforcement (or richer countries because these countries have higher 
quality of law enforcement) are associated with either the entrepreneurial pro debtor model or 
the pro secured creditors model. At the opposite, in developing countries, the social pro debtor 
model and the repressive model prevail. As such, the old vision of bankruptcy law, the 
sanction of the bankrupt manager, continues to operate in the less performing countries. 
Moreover, the pro debtor bankruptcy model, which allows for unsecured creditors (such as 
workers or government) to be ranked before secured creditors during the reorganization 
procedure, performs also in countries with poor legal enforcement and per capita GDP. In 
addition, it appears from table 3 that German civil legal tradition is clearly associated with the 
pro secured creditors model whereas French civil legal origin is associated with more pro 
debtor bankruptcy laws, especially the social pro debtor model. Further, there are two major 
bankruptcy models within the common law legal tradition: the entrepreneurial pro debtor 
model and the repressive one. So, according to the empirical links between legal family, 
quality of law enforcement, and per capita GDP, one could argue that richer common law 
countries aim to promote the bankrupt firm’s continuation (the learning effect and the new 
chance for managers), through the entrepreneurial pro debtor model
16. Finally, since common 
law countries have the greater score for the repressive model, one concludes also that poorer 
countries with common law legal tradition (with poor quality of law enforcement and per 
capita GDP) are the most likely to have a repressive model of all the legal families.  
 
To summarize, the evidence indicates that the bankruptcy puzzle is not only the 
consequence of differences in the level of development, or in the quality of law enforcement. 
Bankruptcy models may also differ between countries because they come from different legal 
families
17. In a dynamic context, legal origins may then constitute a barrier for countries to 
remove their bankruptcy model
18. Looking for making bankruptcy models endogenous, we 
could also suggest with Biais and Recasens (2002) that bankruptcy law is designed by the 
                                                 
16 We note that the social pro debtor model does not perform in common law countries. 
17 Following LLSV (1998), the legal family can be treated as an exogenous variable because countries typically 
adopted their legal systems involuntarily (through conquest or colonization). 
18 We do not explore the dynamic evolution of bankruptcy models. For instance, we may represent bankruptcy 
law (and labour law) as the result of a legal competition between countries in a context of capital and labour 
force mobility. A crucial question would be whether developed countries will move toward a particular 
bankruptcy model.   9 
political parties which have a majority of votes in parliament, and indirectly, therefore, by the 
pivotal voters in that country. For example, pro creditors laws might emerge in countries 
where the pivotal voters are potentially entrepreneurial with greater needs of financing 
through banking sector. In contrast, if governments represent low-income voters, with poor 
access to credit, a pro debtor law might emerge; its aim being to protect workers by 
maintaining distressed firms as a going concern. More generally, the nature of bankruptcy 
codes could also be linked to the relative weight of various stakeholders. We test this 
assumption in the next paragraph. 
 
  UK common law legal 
origin 
French civil law legal 
origin 
German civil law legal 
origin 
Test of means between 
bankruptcy models (Fisher 
Statistics) 
6.75***  3.91**  3.36** 
Social pro debtor model 
average  0  1  0 
Entrepreneurial pro debtor 
model average  0.285  0.428  0.071 
Repressive model average  0.8  0.2  0 
Pro secured creditors 
model average  0  0.4  0.4 
Sample average  0.342  0.457  0.085 
Table 3: bankruptcy law and legal tradition. 
Note: *** means significant at the 1 percent level, ** means significant at the 5 percent level,* means significant 
at the 10 percent level. 
 
3.2 Bankruptcy law, size and structure of financial sector 
 
Our main question here is whether our bankruptcy models actually differ according to 
the size and the structure of the two main sources of financing: debt and equity. To address 
this question, we use two empirical measures of financial sector: its level of development and 
its structure (i.e. whether countries have bank or market oriented financial sector). For the first 
topic, we use for year 2000 the domestic credit provided by banking sector as a share of 
GDP
19, the value of the stock market capitalization, and the stocks value traded. The idea is 
that financial development depends both on the listing of shares per se and from the liquidity 
of the stock market. For the second topic, we use three measures of financial structure 
developed by Levine (2002), and gathered over the 1980-95 period. First, “structure activity” 
is a measure of the activity of stock markets relative to that of banks. It equals the logarithm 
of the value of domestic equities traded on domestic exchanges (as a share of GDP) divided 
by the value of deposit money bank credits to the private sector (as a share of GDP
20). 
Second, “structure size” measures the size of stock markets relative to that of banks. Here, it 
equals the logarithm of the value of domestic equities listed on domestic exchanges (as a 
share of GDP) divided again by the value of deposit money bank credits to the private sector 
(as a share of GDP). Third, we report “structure efficiency”, a measure of the efficiency of 
stock markets relative to that of banks. It equals the logarithm of the value of domestic 
equities traded on domestic exchanges (as a share of GDP) times overhead costs of banking 
                                                 
19 Source: 2002 World Development Indicators on CD-ROM. New York: World Bank 
20 This measure excludes credits to the public sector (central and local governments as well as public enterprises)   10 
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  Bank credit  Total value traded  Market capitalization 
Test of means between 
bankruptcy models (Fisher 
Statistics) 
2.65*  0.40  0.80 
Social pro debtor model 
average  0.259  0.044  0.133 
Entrepreneurial pro debtor 
model average  0.535  0.168  0.307 
Repressive model average  0.352  0.124  0.3 
Pro secured creditors 
model average  0.703  0.096  0.159 
Sample average  0.445  0.126  0.26 
Table 4: bankruptcy law and financial development. 
Note: *** means significant at the 1 percent level, ** means significant at the 5 percent level,*** means 
significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
  Structure activity  Structure size  Structure efficiency 
Test of means between 
bankruptcy models (Fisher 
Statistics) 
0.55  2.22*  0.43 
Social pro debtor model 
average  -1.684  -0.45  -6.029 
Entrepreneurial pro debtor 
model average  -1.613  -0.686  -6.048 
Repressive model average  -2.009  -0.461  -6.745 
Pro secured creditors 
model average  -2.234  -1.252  -6.269 
Sample average  -1.827  -0.662  -6.275 
Table 5: bankruptcy law and structure of financial sector. 
Note: *** means significant at the 1 percent level, ** means significant at the 5 percent level,* means significant 
at the 10 percent level. 
 
The study of tables 4 and 5 reveals that the indicators of financial structure based on 
activity and efficiency do not empirically discriminate between the different bankruptcy 
models detailed in section 2. For instance, the entrepreneurial pro debtor model is not 
specifically associated with the economies characterized by an equity-bond market more 
efficient and active. Further, it is impossible to use either the total value traded or the market 
capitalization to acknowledge the diversity of bankruptcy models. We argue only that bank 
based countries (see the bank credit ratio and the indicator of structure size in tables 4 and 5) 
                                                 
21 To measure the efficiency of stock markets, Levine (2002) uses, as in the first indicator, the value of domestic 
equities traded, which reflects the liquidity of the stock markets. Then, we assume that larger overhead costs are 
associated to larger inefficiencies in the banking sector. 
22 There is a large discussion about the limits of these indicators of financial structure (Demirguc-Kunt and 
Levine (1999)). For example, financial structure measures dealing with activity, size or efficiency may be large 
either because the country has well-developed markets (the United States) or because it has very poorly 
developed banks (Brazil, Mexico). Similarly, a country may have small financial structure indicators either 
because its banks are comparatively well-developed or because its markets are relatively undeveloped. However, 
contrary to Levine (2002), we do not attempt to evaluate for the impact of the financial structure on economic 
growth. We test the correspondence between the bankruptcy models and the measures of financial sector. So, 
even if the low value of an indicator is due to the undevelopment of stock market or to the relative excessive 
development of the banking sector, it gives us some information about the relative weight of both financial 
sectors. Taking into account these limits, we have to combine two oppositions: the classification bank based or 
market based and the distinction between well developed financial sectors and developing ones.   11 
are more frequently associated with the pro secured creditors model. As such, the bankruptcy 
model gives stronger rights to secured creditors (not to shareholders) according to their 
relative size (not their efficiency or their activity) in the financial structure of countries. The 
resulting risk is that secured creditors adopt an opportunistic behaviour or generate type I 
errors during firms’ reorganizations. One could alternatively argue that it is efficient to allow 
for the main investor to dominate the bankruptcy process in order to reduce credit rationing. 
 
3.3 Bankruptcy law, labour market and regulation of market entry of new firms 
 
In this section, our starting point is the hypothesis that the reorganization/liquidation 
legal process (or, equivalently the legal barriers to market exit) may be linked to two other 
areas of the law. First, we explore the legal rules dealing with the creation of new firms 
because the creation rate of new firms, in addition to the conjonctural effects, clearly affects 
the corporate bankruptcy rate. Second, the legal protection of workers may serve to 
understand why some bankruptcy models promote continuation of firm’s operations, or allow 
for deviations from absolute priority rule in favour of workers. To identify the legislation 
dealing with creation of new firms, we use an indicator including all procedures required to 
launch a firm, the average time spent during each procedure, and the official cost of each 
procedure (Botero, Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, (2004)). Further, to measure the 
flexibility of labour regulations, we use a rigidity employment index issued by World Bank in 
its doing business reports. It is the average of three data: the difficulty of hiring a new worker, 
the restrictions on expanding or contracting the number of working hours, and the difficulty 
and expense of dismissing a redundant worker. In both cases, higher values of indicators 












create a firm 
Cost of each 
procedure to 
create a firm 
Test of means between 
bankruptcy models 
(Fisher Statistics) 
3.07**  3.35**  2.51*  1.66 
Social pro debtor model 
average  59.5  11.17  68.17  18.8 
Entrepreneurial pro debtor 
model average  33.07  6.28  19.78  8.74 
Repressive model average  34.7  9.9  50.6  59.22 
Pro secured creditors 
model average  40.2  6.6  44  7.94 
Sample average  39.08  8.2  40.34  24.77 
Table 6: bankruptcy law, legal protection of workers, and regulation of creation of new firms. 
Note: *** means significant at the 1 percent level, ** means significant at the 5 percent level,* means significant 
at the 10 percent level. 
 
The results in table 6 suggest that the social pro debtor model performs in countries 
within which the legal barriers to market entry and the legal protection of workers are the 
more severe. All the legal rules, by favouring the protection of workers, consequently reflect 
some homogeneity. Strong barriers to market entry, by reducing the default risk, protect then 
workers from the risk to lose their jobs due to firms’ bankruptcies. For the entrepreneurial pro 
debtor model, all legal measures enforce the firm’s continuation as a going concern with the 
same manager, the flexibility on labour market making this project easier within a legal   12 
institution which encourages the creation of new firms
23 (learning effect). At the opposite, the 
repressive model (and the pro secured creditors model at a lower level), with large barriers at 
the market entry for emerging firms, improves the exit of failing companies by protecting the 




In this paper, we study an unexplored territory in the area of comparative bankruptcy 
law: the correspondence between bankruptcy law and the overall system of firm’s 
governance. We confirm that the classical opposition between pro debtors and pro secured 
creditors models does not capture all the diversity of the national legislations. We then 
propose an original typology of bankruptcy models and discuss the expected costs and risks 
associated with each model. The problem is that the lack of data prevents us from empirically 
evaluating the ex ante/ex post efficiency of bankruptcy systems. However, the evidence 
provided in the paper supports five results on the manner that bankruptcy systems are 
matching with other areas of firm’s governance
24. First, the repressive model and the legal 
protection of bankrupt debtors prevail in developing countries. Second, the differences in 
bankruptcy models across countries reflect also differences in some exogenous conditions, 
especially the legal tradition. Our results contest the recurrent tension between common law 
and civil law about the protection of investors. Whereas German civil law countries better 
protect the secured creditors, Common law countries (controlling for higher levels of GDP per 
capita and quality of law enforcement) and French civil law countries exhibit both pro debtor 
models even if their objective differs. Third, we find that countries, whose financial system is 
bank based, are more frequently associated with secured creditors’ friendly bankruptcy 
models. Fourth, we suggest that bankruptcy law and labour law are well matched either to 
protect the creditor's interest, or to ensure the continuation of financially distressed firms. 
Fifth, there exists an entrepreneurial institutional structure within which a pro debtor 
bankruptcy system is associated with poor legal barriers on the creation of new firms. 
However, it is less clear that the pro secured creditors model is associated with larger barriers 




Annex 1: description of proxies for law enforcement 
 
Variables  Description (Source: LLSV (1998)) 
Efficiency of 
Judicial System 
“Assessment of the efficiency and integrity of the legal environment as it affects business, 
particularly foreign firms produced by the country risk rating agency Business International Corp. 
Average between 1980 and 1983. Scale from zero to 10; with lower scores, lower efficiency levels.” 
Rule of Law 
“Assessment of the law and order tradition in the country produced by the country risk agency 
International Country Risk. Average of the months of April and October of the monthly index 
between 1982 and 1995. Scale from zero 10,; with lower scores for less tradition for law and order.” 
Corruption 
“International Country risk’s assessment of the corruption in government. Average of the months of 
April and October of the monthly index between 1982 and 1995. Scale from zero to 10, with lower 
scores for higher levels of corruption.” 
Risk of 
Expropriation 
“International Country risk’s assessment of the risk of outright confiscation or forced nationalization. 
Average of the months of April and October of the monthly index between 1982 and 1995. Scale 
from zero to 10, with lower scores for higher risks.” 
 
                                                 
23 The costs associated with the procedures required to create a new firm are not significant. 
24 These assertions are confirmed using several data sets issued from the Financial Structure and Economic 
Development Database of the World Bank and the financial data developed by Levine (2002).   13 
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